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THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE AND THE COMMON LAW:
REGULATORY SUBSTITUTES OR COMPLEMENTS?
Catherine M. Sharkey*
ABSTRACT
The modern administrative state looms larger than ever, and grows at an
ever-accelerating pace. Federal agencies have proliferated in virtually every
significant regulatory domain. U.S. government spending on federal regulatory
activity in 2014 is estimated to have been $49.8 billion. Federal agencies now
employ approximately 284,000 people, and the Code of Federal Regulations
now weighs in at over 175,000 pages. Not everyone is pleased with these
developments.
Four such individuals—Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Thomas, Alito, and
the late Justice Scalia—have expressed their displeasure, indeed their alarm,
with consistency, clarity, and vigor. They warn that the rise of administrative
agencies, and the attendant ascendance of doctrines of mandatory judicial
deference to agency interpretations of federal law, signals no less than the end
of our government’s separation-of-powers structure, and our right to live our
lives without fear of bureaucratic encroachment at every turn. Their opinions
and dissents sounding this theme reverberate with seemingly unprecedented
urgency in the face of a never-before-encountered threat.
As it turns out, however, the same alarm bell was sounded decades ago—
by Roscoe Pound. Pound viewed administrative action as lawless, capricious,
and marred by prejudice. He warned that agencies were self-interested, too
powerful, and ever grasping for even more power.
After outlining the uncannily similar attitude towards agencies expressed
by Pound and our Supreme Court’s conservative core, this Article probes how
those views diverge. For Pound, the ideal regulatory alternative to agency
action was the common law of torts, which he characterized as the last bastion
of a democratic society. This is decidedly not the view of the conservative core.
Their antagonism towards the common law of torts, which apparently runs
* Crystal Eastman Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. Amanda Sterling (NYU
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even deeper than their hostility towards agencies, is on full display in their
federal preemption decisions. How, then, to fill the regulatory void the
conservative core seems to leave agape? This Article proposes one possible
path to the answer.
Drawing inspiration from the views of Pound himself, as well as the work
of Guido Calabresi, this Article proposes that courts should adopt an
altogether new approach, one whereby they effectively incorporate input from
federal agencies, while at the same time ensuring that such agencies do not
overreach. This need not entail the wholesale rejection of agency interpretive
authority espoused by the conservative core in its non-preemption decisions.
Instead, and as even Pound recognized, courts can and should exercise
oversight to ensure that agency interpretations and conclusions are backed by
responsible rulemaking procedures and empirical support. This approach can
lead to an effective tort–agency partnership, where the administrative state
and common law can operate as regulatory complements.
INTRODUCTION
The growth of the national government is perhaps the most significant
feature of the past century. Concomitant with this expansion is the growth of
the Executive Branch, which “now wields vast power and touches almost
every aspect of daily life.”1 There has been a “dramatic shift in power over the
last 50 years from Congress to the Executive.”2 That “shift [has been] effected
through the administrative agencies.”3 The emergence of administrative
agencies as a “fourth branch” of American government has had dramatic
repercussions on the evolution of the common law of torts, and the further
expansion of the administrative state calls for innovative responses.4 Federal
1

Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010).
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1886 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
3 Id.
4 The “fourth branch” of American government has a long history. See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(2012). But its current rate of growth is unprecedented. The New Deal was a watershed moment, and over the
last half-century—particularly during the last fifteen years—federal agencies have proliferated in virtually
every significant regulatory domain. See generally id. (examining the foundation and evolution of
administrative law in the United States); CHARLES MURRAY, BY THE PEOPLE: REBUILDING LIBERTY WITHOUT
PERMISSION (2015) (tracing the rise of the administrative state and summarizing the major doctrines that
govern it); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST–BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002)
(discussing the rapid development of the fourth branch following the New Deal). Between 1960 and 2014,
government spending on federal regulatory activity skyrocketed from $2.87 billion (adjusted for inflation) to
an estimated $49.8 billion. SUSAN DUDLEY & MELINDA WARREN, WEIDENBAUM CTR. ON THE ECON., GOV’T &
2
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preemption of state tort law—whereby, for example, a regulation promulgated
by a federal agency ousts competing state tort law claims—is a salient
illustration of how agency regulation supersedes (or even subverts) regulation
by tort litigation.5
The conventional view is that the administrative state poses a threat to the
common law of torts and, to the extent that the fourth branch is resisted or
dismantled, common law torts will flourish once again.6 Indeed, for this
symposium I was asked to address two provocative questions: Has the
administrative state replaced our common law tort system in the United States?
And, in the wake of preemption, is our status as a common law country now a
thing of the past?
Perhaps not coincidentally (given the Pound Institute’s cosponsorship of
the symposium), Roscoe Pound is typically invoked as one who—with great
PUB. POLICY & GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. REGULATORY STUDIES CTR., SEQUESTER’S IMPACT ON
REGULATORY AGENCIES MODEST: AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. BUDGET FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2013 AND 2014, at 25 tbl.A-5 (2013), http://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/
regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/files/downloads/2014_Regulators_Budget.pdf. Staffing associated with
this activity increased from approximately 57,000 full-time-equivalent employees to roughly 284,000. Id. at 26
tbl.a–6. And the Code of Federal Regulations (a proxy for regulatory activity, albeit an imperfect one) has
expanded from just short of 23,000 pages to a massive 175,000-plus pages. Code of Federal
Regulations: Total Pages 1938–1949, Total Volumes and Pages 1950–2014, OFF. FED. REG. (2015),
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2015/05/Code-of-Federal-Regulations-Total-Pages-and-Volumes1938-2014.pdf. It may well be, moreover, that we will look back on the early twenty-first century as another
surge in regulatory expansion.
5 See generally Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933 (2008) (discussing the “regulatory
federalism issues” that arise from preemption of state law, including the common law of tort, in the
administrative agency context); Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U.
L. REV. 695 (2008) (critiquing modern cases in which agency regulations have been held to preempt state law);
Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet Spot, 13 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73 (2008) (exploring the conflict between federal agency authority and state tort law
through the lens of preemptive FDA regulations); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An
Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449 (2008) [hereinafter Sharkey, Products Liability
Preemption] (examining the agency preemption issue in the context of products liability law); Catherine M.
Sharkey, Tort-Agency Partnerships in an Age of Preemption, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 359 (2014)
[hereinafter Sharkey, Tort-Agency Partnerships] (endorsing a new model that would enable both federal
agencies and state tort law to operate in the health and safety “enforcement preemption” context).
6 Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Why the Modern Administrative State Is Inconsistent with the Rule of Law,
3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 491, 494 (2008) (observing that “systematic forms of regulation,” such as that
established by the modern administrative state, introduce the danger “that legislatures will dismantle
worthwhile common law conceptions”); Schuck, supra note 5, at 73–76 (observing the institutional
competition between tort law and administrative regulations); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by
Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 227–29 (2007)
(discussing the conflict between the administrative state and the common law of torts).
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chagrin—would answer both questions in the affirmative.7 Particularly in the
later stages of his life and work, Pound evolved into a bitter critic of the New
Deal and the growth of the administrative state. In a precursor to the warnings
about executive overreach articulated by today’s “conservative core” on the
Supreme Court, Pound inveighed against the dangerous accretion of
centralized power and the expansion of a discretionary Executive Branch,
which he claimed—as have Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito—threaten our balanced government and endanger the liberty of
individual Americans.8
Roscoe Pound’s rants against the administrative state reverberate in recent
times in the passionate prose of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Alito
and (especially) Thomas. As critics of the New Deal and the administrative
state, Pound and these conservative core Justices envision a glorified
nineteenth-century version of American government and rule of law, to which
they yearn to return. But their wishful routes to the past diverge. Pound’s
idealized vision elevates the common law of torts, forged through jury trials
and adversarial legal processes, which vests regulatory power in the people and
the courts, rather than in a centralized, bureaucratic system. The conservative
core Justices show no such nostalgia for the common law of torts; their
arguments for taming the administrative beast have a distinctly deregulatory
thrust.9 Their position shows that resistance to the administrative state does not
7

See, e.g., KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1790–1900:
LEGAL THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM 285–87 (2011) (discussing Pound’s views on the subject); Mark
Fenster, The Birth of a “Logical System”: Thurman Arnold and the Making of Modern Administrative Law,
84 OR. L. REV. 69, 80–85 (2005) (describing Pound’s attitudes toward the administrative state, as well as those
of his contemporaries); James A. Gardner, The Sociological Jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound (Part II), 7 VILL.
L. REV. 165, 169 (1962) (“When economists, political scientists, and planners have endeavored to render
greater services to the people under law and through administrative agencies adapted to this purpose, Pound
has seen grave objections. In attempting to render such services, Pound warns, we have become a ‘service
state’ which as it develops is a ‘super-state’ and par excellance a ‘bureau state.’”).
8 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Recrudescence of Absolutism, 47 SEWANEE REV. 18, 27 (1939)
[hereinafter Pound, The Recrudescence of Absolutism] (observing the need, in a legal system in which
bureaucratic officials wield the authority that they do in the modern administrative state, to find a balance that
is sufficiently protective of “the individual life,” as well as to “safeguard the individual against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercises of [administrative officials’] power”); Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law,
13 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 703 (1913) [hereinafter Pound, Justice According to Law] (noting the dangers to
personal liberty posed by a system bearing the hallmarks of the administrative state). For further elaboration,
see infra Part I.A.
9 For commentary on the “pro-business” or deregulatory inclinations of the Roberts Court, see generally
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN.
L. REV. 1431 (2013) (analyzing pro- and anti-business decisions issued by the Supreme Court in order to
evaluate the role that ideology plays in these cases); Annual Conference 2014: Administrative Law and
Financial Regulation Symposium, COLUM. L. SCH., http://web.law.columbia.edu/constitutional-
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necessarily pave the way for the flourishing of the common law of torts. A
close study of recent pharmaceutical drug and medical device preemption
cases demonstrates, moreover, that these Justices’ hostility toward the
administrative state—and, more specifically, their efforts to rein in agencies’
authoritative power by curtailing doctrines that accord deference to agency
interpretations of statutes and regulations—does not lead inexorably to an antipreemption position in defense of the common law of torts.
Part I presents the conventional view that the administrative state represents
an enemy of the common law of torts as regulator. Pound exemplifies the
position that combines hostility toward the administrative state with a
celebration of the common law of torts as substitute regulator.10 Part II presents
the modern Supreme Court “conservative core” Justices’ surprisingly similar
attack on the administrative state, which diverges from Pound’s position in its
hostility toward the common law of torts, as evident in these Justices’ opinions
in federal preemption cases. This juxtaposition of Pound with the conservative
core yields two important insights: first, the fact that the Justices’ forbears
tried, as mightily as do they, to staunch the growth of the administrative state
suggests that the behemoth may be tamed but not defeated; second—and more
significant, for purposes of this Article—it does not follow that resistance to
the administrative state, standing alone, necessarily creates an environment in
which the common law of torts will flourish. Certainly, this is not the aim of
the current detractors of the administrative state who sit on the Supreme Court
today.
Part III gestures toward a new vision of tort law in the twenty-first century.
Pound11—and, later, Guido Calabresi12—recognized statutes as the primary
challengers to judicial power. Today, that position is occupied by the
governance/events/annual-conference-2014 (last visited Jan. 11, 2016) (presenting information relating to
financial regulation and administrative law); Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-aredefining-this-supreme-court.html (reporting on the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence in cases involving business
interests). Some have argued, however, that this “pro-business” tendency is misconceived. See, e.g., Jonathan
H. Adler, Business and the Roberts Court Revisited (Again), VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 6, 2013, 11:20 PM),
http://volokh.com/2013/05/06/business-and-the-roberts-court-revisited-again/ (challenging the aforementioned
study by Epstein, Landes, and Posner).
10 See infra notes 27–33 and accompanying text.
11 See generally Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908) (evaluating
the merits of statutory and judge-made law).
12 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5 (1982) (“[S]tarting with the
Progressive Era but with increasing rapidity since the New Deal, we have become a nation governed by
written laws.”).
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regulatory state and its dominant federal agencies. Pound and Calabresi
resisted, however, a turn toward an attitude that since has been termed
“common-law chauvinism.”13 Calabresi, moreover, promoted colloquy
between the courts and legislatures, envisioning a “legislative–judicial
dialogue that seeks to make modern lawmaking as responsive to the need for
continuity and change as common law adjudication was said to have been in
another age.”14 Given the vastly important—and, seemingly, largely fixed—
role of the fourth branch in the modern system of American government,15 our
twenty-first-century challenge is to harness judicial oversight to promote that
colloquy between courts and federal agencies.
I. ROSCOE POUND AND THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE’S THREAT TO REGULATION BY COMMON LAW
A conventional view posits federal health and safety regulation and tort
liability as regulatory substitutes.16 The growth of the administrative state
poses a threat to the common law of torts, on this view, because it will replace
the ex post, decentralized form of private regulation via litigation with ex ante,
centralized public administrative rules.17 Pound is an effective poster child for
this position, as he coupled a deep, bitter hostility toward growing
administrative power with an equal passion for the common law form of
regulation.
13 JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW 257
(2007) (discussing Pound’s work and “common-law chauvinism”); see also CALABRESI, supra note 12, at 164
(addressing the role of the common law in light of the statutory proliferation of the early twentieth century);
Pound, supra note 11, at 403–06 (identifying statutory law as “the more truly democratic” legal form, and
suggesting that courts abandon their “attitude of antipathy toward legislative innovation”).
14 CALABRESI, supra note 12, at 129.
15 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY 216 (1990) (“Doctrine and scholarship repeat endlessly the battle to legitimate the
administrative state, when fifty years have established beyond peradventure that big government is here to
stay.”); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Administrative War, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343 (2014) (tracing the
evolution and entrenchment of the fourth branch); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law, Public
Administration, and the Administrative Conference of the United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1517–
18 (2015) (discussing how the administrative state has become a fixture in modern American government).
16 See Richard A. Posner, Regulation (Agencies) Versus Litigation (Courts): An Analytical Framework,
in REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW 11 (Daniel P. Kessler ed.,
2011); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 358–64 (1984).
17 See Shavell, supra note 16, at 358–64; see also, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and
Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545 (2007) (describing the danger to tort law
posed by the rise of the administrative state, looking to the environmental law context as an example of this
dynamic); David S. Rubenstein, The Paradox of Administrative Preemption, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267
(2015) (examining the administrative state’s power to oust state tort law through preemptive regulations).
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A. Hostility Toward the Administrative State
In the mid-twentieth century, Pound became an especially acerbic critic of
the New Deal and the expanding administrative state.18 He made spirited
attacks on what he perceived to be the lawless, biased, and self-dealing nature
of agency decision-making and, from his academic perch at Harvard Law
School, disseminated his views widely to the general public.19 John Witt
elaborates:
Administrative action, Pound wrote in a widely discussed American
Bar Association report in 1938, proceeded lawlessly, without notice
to or hearings for the interested parties. Administrators seemed to
make determinations according to caprice and prejudice rather than
reasoned analysis of the evidence. Agencies dangerously combined
rule-making, investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions,
and as a result tended to construe legal questions in their own favor
and against the individuals who fell within their jurisdiction. They
“yield[ed] to political pressure” and “administrative convenience” at
“the expense of the law,” alternating between partisan politics and “a
perfunctory routine” that was almost as bad.20

Pound used even more colorful language in his letters. In a 1952 letter to the
secretary of the Council Against Communist Aggression (of which he served
as vice-chairman), he describes American administrative agencies as a
‘“veritable chamber of horrors’ filled with ‘lawless high-handedness.’”21 In
other writings and speeches, Pound elaborates upon this scathing criticism,
going so far as to compare the theoretical underpinnings of the administrative
state to “the rise and vogue of dictators” outside the English-speaking world.22
A recurring theme in Pound’s essays, speeches, and letters is the
administrative state as a stand-in for the totalitarian state. Invoking the specter
of autocracy, Pound argues forcefully for adjudication by common law judges
on the theory that, under the alternative system dominated by administrative
decision-making, “we may as well give up all pretense of being a constitutional
18 See generally MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA
CHICAGO 315–16 (2003) (describing Pound’s infamous “thunderous assault on the New Deal state”).
19 Id.
20 WITT, supra note 13, at 232 (alteration in original).
21 Id. at 233 (quoting Letter from Roscoe Pound, Vice Chairman, Council Against Communist
Aggression, to Arthur G. McDowell, Sec’y, Council Against Communist Aggression (Dec. 30, 1952); and then
quoting Letter from Roscoe Pound, Vice Chairman, Council Against Communist Aggression, to Arthur G.
McDowell, Sec’y, Council Against Communist Aggression (Nov. 26, 1951)).
22 Pound, The Recrudescence of Absolutism, supra note 8, at 26.
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democracy and set up an avowed dictatorship.”23 Pound relied upon local
juries to resist undemocratic exercises of power.24 To Pound, trial lawyers—
whom administrative agencies threatened to dislodge—represented the last
bulwark against the modern totalitarian state.25 These “‘uncompromising and
inveterate foe[s] of absolutism’ . . . would resist the encroachments of the
totalizing state ‘until communism or the millennium’ brought an end to law
altogether.”26
B. Celebration of the Common Law of Torts
While eschewing the onslaught of administration, Pound welcomed in its
stead vigorous regulation by tort law, fueled by claims advanced by private
litigants and their attorneys. Trial lawyers, according to Pound, would restore
democracy.27
Likening trial lawyers to “[c]ommon-law lawyers such as Sir Edward Coke
[who] had fought off the despotism of the Stuart monarchs in the seventeenth
century,” Pound charges them with the daunting task of defending the common
law system of torts against encroachment by the administrative state.28
Invoking the figure of Coke, Pound draws repeated parallels between
23 WITT, supra note 13, at 232 (quoting DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 274
(1974)).
24 See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 18 (1910) (“The will of the
state at large imposed on a reluctant community . . . find[s] the same obstacle in the local jury that formerly
confronted kings and ministers.”).
25 See Pound, The Recrudescence of Absolutism, supra note 8, at 27–28 (identifying litigation—and the
threat thereof—as a critical check on oppressive exercises of administrative power); see also Roscoe Pound,
Executive Justice, 55 AM. L. REG. 137, 144 (1907) [hereinafter Pound, Executive Justice] (identifying
litigation as the primary vehicle for the “[t]he administration of justice, properly so called” (quoting JOHN W.
SALMOND, THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE 75 (London, Stevens & Haynes Law Publishers 1893)));
Roscoe Pound, Address by Professor Roscoe Pound Before New Hampshire Bar Association: The Revival of
Personal Government (June 30, 1917) (observing that “we must have recourse to lawyers” in order to ensure
effective government).
26 WITT, supra note 13, at 253 (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Reader’s Digest Article, 15 NAT’L ASS’N
CLAIMANTS’ COMPENSATION ATT’YS L.J. 21, 23–28 (1955)).
27 Id. Pound did not always champion the trial lawyer as the guardian of the integrity of the legal
system—indeed, he attracted attention early in his career for his criticism of the adversarial system and trial
attorney profession, which he believed rendered the judge “a mere umpire” and “disfigure[d] our judicial
administration at every point.” See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 738 (1906); see also DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S
NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940, at 109–10 (2014) (discussing
the reaction to Pound’s early criticism of the modern court system). What is key, here, is how his position
evolved—namely, his later vitriolic attack on the administrative state was inspired, at least in part, by his
desire to see the flourishing of the common law of torts and its participants, the trial lawyers.
28 WITT, supra note 13, at 252.
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seventeenth-century England and the New Deal-era administrative state.29 In
one particularly relevant address delivered at Harvard in 1920, he argues:
Not the least task of the common-law lawyers of the future will be to
impose a legal yoke upon [those] commissions [charged with
administrative agency action], as Coke and his fellows did upon the
organs of executive justice in Tudor and Stuart England, and to
reshape and develop the materials of our common law as efficient
instruments of justice in the twentieth century so that reversion to
oriental methods no longer seems necessary.30

Pound joined forces with the plaintiffs’ bar to resist the behemoth
administrative state, and these lawyers apparently proved “as useful for Pound
as he was for them.”31 To this end, Pound worked with Melvin Belli and a
plaintiffs’ attorney organization called the National Association of Claimants’
Compensation Attorneys (a precursor to the modern American Association of
Justice) to fight bureaucratic encroachment upon the sphere traditionally
occupied by the common law of torts.32 In resisting the rise of the
administrative state—particularly the increased use of administrative
compensation schemes—these trial attorneys “fought hard, and often
successfully, to preserve the tort system with its unlimited damages, its juries,
its ‘adequate awards,’ and its contingency fees, against all administrative
challengers.”33

29 See, e.g., Pound, The Recrudescence of Absolutism, supra note 8, at 25–26 (drawing a parallel between
seventeenth-century England and the New Deal-era administrative state). Even in his earlier work,
seventeenth-century England (and Sir Coke in particular) was a substantial preoccupation of Pound. See, e.g.,
Pound, supra note 11, at 390–400 (drawing upon principles that emerged during Coke’s seventeenth-century
England to argue for the primacy of the common law); Pound, Executive Justice, supra note 25, at 144
(quoting Coke’s conceptions of judicial authority in making a point about the role of the courts in the modern
administrative state).
30 ROSCOE POUND, THE LAW SCHOOL AND THE COMMON LAW 19 (1920); see also, e.g., Roscoe Pound et
al., Report on the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 331, 352 (1938) (arguing
that the administrative framework was contrary to Coke’s theories and the intentions of the Framers).
31 WITT, supra note 13, at 252.
32 Id. at 252–53. There is some disagreement among scholars as to whether Pound’s work with Belli is
fairly characterized as a concerted campaign in pursuit of the two’s shared goals. See Joseph A. Page, Roscoe
Pound, Melvin Belli, and the Personal-Injury Bar: The Tale of an Odd Coupling, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
637, 652–54 (2009) (downplaying Pound’s relationship with Belli and emphasizing instead his relationship
with Samuel B. Horovitz, co-founder of the plaintiffs’ attorney organization).
33 WITT, supra note 13, at 264.
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II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY THREAT OF
REGULATION BY EITHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE OR THE COMMON LAW
Pound’s diatribes in his later work against the incursion of the
administrative state on the common law judicial process bear a striking
resemblance to today’s Justices’ alarm bells about the modern-era fourth
branch. To be sure, there are some salient differences. Chief among Pound’s
aims was the preservation and expansion of common law torts, jury trials, and
courts,34 whereas the modern Justices who bemoan administrative power are
no champions of common law tort. Instead, their antipathy stems from
separation-of-powers concerns and, if anything, a predilection for deregulation
writ large.
A. Hostility Toward the Administrative State
More than a half-century after Pound’s rant against the administrative state,
the modern conservative core Supreme Court Justices sound a similar theme,
challenging the discretionary authority wielded by administrative agencies.
With increasing verve, several Justices have decried the ever-inflating
administrative state. In one recent case, Justice Scalia laments, “Too many
important decisions of the Federal Government are made nowadays by
unelected agency officials exercising broad lawmaking authority, rather than
by the people’s representatives in Congress.”35 Evincing even greater alarm,
Chief Justice Roberts warns of “the danger posed by the growing power of the
administrative state,” which involves “hundreds of federal agencies poking
into every nook and cranny of daily life.”36 And Justice Thomas has inveighed
against the Progressive era “move from the individualism that had long
characterized American society to the concept of a society organized for
collective action.”37 Justice Thomas blames the Progressives for “usher[ing] in
significant expansions of the administrative state, ultimately culminating in the

34 See Roscoe Pound, The Growth of Administrative Justice, 2 WIS. L. REV. 321, 335–39 (1924). Again,
my focus here is later in Pound’s career, see supra note 27, when he came to regard the common law’s role in
the legal system as pivotal. See generally ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 173–74 (1921)
(reasoning that the common law and statutes each play pivotal roles in the American legal system but asserting
that “on the whole, the traditional [judge-made] element is by far the more important”); WITT, supra note 13,
at 255 (describing the development of Pound’s support for the common law).
35 EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1610 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
37 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1223 n.6 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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New Deal,” spurred by a “belief that bureaucrats might more effectively
govern the country than the American people.”38
Unwittingly forging a link with Pound, these Justices invoke
seventeenth-century English despotism as the closest analog to the
administrative state. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have termed this
rhetorical trend the rise of “The New Coke”:
Those who express this concern appeal to putative principles of the
Anglo-American constitutional order, particularly resistance to
executive “prerogative”—the lawless despotism of the Stuart kings.
And the heroic opponent of Stuart despotism is the common-law
judge, symbolized by Edward Coke. Where there are newly
enthroned Stuarts, there must also be a New Coke.39

They claim that the Justices’ (and in particular, Justice Thomas’s) recent
invective against the administrative state has been fueled by academic work,
principally a provocative 2014 book by Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative
Law Unlawful?, which “call[s] for a return to a (quite possibly imaginary)
Anglo-American common-law order, cast as an alternative to Stuart tyranny
founded on monarchical prerogative.”40
While its intellectual origins may be questioned, the Justices’ newfound
antipathy toward the administrative state cannot be gainsaid. In a set of
administrative law decisions over the past five years—primarily addressing the
scope of deference that courts should give to federal agencies’ interpretations
of congressional statutes (Chevron deference) and to agencies’ interpretations
of their own regulations (Auer deference)—the conservative core Justices have
outlined a wide-scale attack on the administrative state.41 A series of opinions
issued by the conservative core demonstrate these Justices’ deep skepticism of
38

Id.
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Administrative Law, 2016
SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2631873.
40 Id. (manuscript at 7).
41 I have chosen to focus on this set of decisions impacting Chevron and Auer deference not only because
they illustrate the mantra of tyranny prevention invoked by the Justices, but also because they are doctrines
critical to modern preemption jurisprudence, which I will take up infra Part II.B. For this reason, I do not
discuss what may be perhaps the most blatant invocation of the despot imagery by Justice Thomas in
Department of Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads, involving the (largely defunct) non-delegation
doctrine. 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240–55 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas’s views
here represent an outlier view, even amidst the conservative core. As characterized by Sunstein and Vermeule,
Thomas’s view is that “any administrative authority to ‘bind’ private parties—no matter how interstitial the
issue, how clear the policy guidance from the legislature or how specific the grant of authority—represents a
revival of Stuart prerogative.” Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 39 (manuscript at 16).
39
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the theoretical underpinnings of the modern administrative state and illustrate
their constant search for ways to shrink it.42
1. Auer Deference at Risk
Auer deference grants agencies wide latitude to construe their own
regulations,43 and courts accord great weight to this type of agency
interpretation.44 According to this doctrine, the agency’s interpretation will be
deemed “controlling” unless the court determines that it is “plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation.”45 The Supreme Court’s decision in Auer v.
Robbins built upon a much earlier case, Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,
in which the Court identified an agency’s interpretation of a regulation as “the
ultimate criterion” for purposes of construing that regulation.46 Seminole Rock,
however, was decided before the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), and, indeed, long before the rise of the modern framework of judicial
deference to agency interpretations.47
The most striking attack on Auer deference thus far was issued by Justice
Scalia, somewhat paradoxically, as he authored the Auer majority opinion in
1997.48 Sixteen years later, Justice Scalia described the doctrine as “a

42 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Perez, 135 S. Ct. at
1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct.
1326, 1338 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156
(2012); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). See generally
discussion infra Part II.A.1–2.
43 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
44 See generally Cynthia Barmore, Auer in Action: Deference After Talk America, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 813
(2015) (analyzing the results of a study on the ways in which the federal courts apply Auer in practice, which
revealed that these courts defer to agencies on these questions in the overwhelming majority of cases); William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008) (examining the doctrine
developed in Auer alongside other rules governing judicial deference to administrative agencies’ actions).
45 Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359
(1989)).
46 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
47 See generally Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole
Rock, 65 EMORY L.J. 47, 52 (2015) (observing that “Seminole Rock began as a doctrine with significant
constraints, at a vastly different moment in administrative law” and discussing the doctrine’s evolution and
propriety in the modern administrative state).
48 Auer, 519 U.S. at 452. At issue in Auer was the Department of Labor’s interpretation of its own
regulations, which the Department had developed pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Id. at 454.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia held that the agency’s interpretation was entitled to deference
unless that construction was “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” it purported to interpret. Id.
at 461 (quoting Robertson, 490 U.S. at 359).
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dangerous permission slip for the arrogation of power.”49 In Decker v.
Northwest Environmental Defense Center, Justice Scalia sharply dissented
from the portion of the Court’s opinion that, relying on Auer, deferred to the
EPA’s interpretation of its own Industrial Stormwater Rule,50 which the
majority had deemed “a reasonable interpretation of [the agency’s] own
regulation.”51 The thrust of Justice Scalia’s argument is that, if an agency is
allowed to interpret its own regulations, it wields the power to both write the
law (a legislative function) and interpret and enforce the law (an executive
function), thus raising a serious separation-of-powers issue.52 According to
Justice Scalia, this is a perilous position in light of the potential for tyranny:
“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, . . .
there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical
manner.”53

49 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Sunstein and Vermeule comment that Justice Scalia’s characterization “strikes us as one of
the New Coke’s phantasmal terrors.” Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 39 (manuscript at 24).
50 133 S. Ct. at 1339–44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51 Id. at 1330–31 (majority opinion). Two years earlier, Justice Scalia dropped hints of his about-face on
Auer deference. In Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., a unanimous Court approved a Federal
Communications Commission interpretation relating to the agency’s own regulations, which agency officials
had put forth in an amicus brief. 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2262–65 (2011). In a separate concurrence, Justice Scalia
foreshadowed the view that would emerge in his later opinions, announcing:

It is comforting to know that I would reach the Court’s result even without Auer. For while I
have in the past uncritically accepted that rule, I have become increasingly doubtful of its
validity. . . . It seems contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit the
person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.
Id. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia proceeded to make a more pointed challenge to the doctrine:
“We have not been asked to reconsider Auer in the present case. When we are, I will be receptive to doing so.”
Id.
52 Justice Scalia was persuaded by the arguments raised by John Manning. See, e.g., id. at 2265–66 (“The
defects of Auer deference, and the alternatives to it, are fully explored [by] Manning.” (citing John F.
Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996))). Indeed, Manning’s seminal article emerged as something of a talking point
in Scalia’s attacks on Auer deference. See, e.g., Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing the same Manning article for the proposition that “Auer is not a logical corollary to
Chevron but a dangerous permission slip for the arrogation of power”). The conservative core has picked up
this argument and advanced it in the other major recent cases in which they call Auer into question. See Perez
v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (citing the same Manning article); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168
(2012) (same).
53 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (ellipsis in
original) (quoting 11 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151–52 (O. Piest ed., T. Nugent trans.,
1949)); see also Talk Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2266 (same). As Sunstein and Vermeule comment, “There is
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In a separate concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justice Alito)54
makes plain that he too would welcome the opportunity to revisit Auer
deference—an issue he deemed “basic,” and “going to the heart of
administrative law.”55 The Chief Justice declined to opine on the substance of
the doctrine, expressly reserving such discussion for “a case in which the issue
is properly raised and argued.”56 Justice Scalia, however, seized the
opportunity in his heated dissent to outline the intellectual foundations for the
Auer critique, which would soon prove persuasive to his fellow conservative
core Justices.
In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n,57 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito
solidified their resistance to Auer deference. These Justices went out of their
way to address the validity and likely fate of the doctrine, authoring separate
concurrences to a majority opinion that hardly mentioned it. Indeed, Perez had
little to do with Auer deference; the central issue before the Court was the
extent to which courts could engraft additional requirements onto § 553 of the
APA.58 The Court held that courts cannot require a federal agency to undergo
the notice-and-comment process detailed in § 553 of the APA to issue an
interpretation of its own regulation, even when such interpretation differs
substantially from one that the agency has previously adopted.59 In a footnote,
the majority rejects the argument that, because agency interpretive rules may
be subject to Auer deference, they are in essence “legislative” rather than

something overheated, wildly disproportionate, about the New Coke’s critique of Auer.” Sunstein & Vermeule,
supra note 39 (manuscript at 26).
54 Justice Alito penned the majority opinion in an earlier case, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
which foreshadowed the Justices’ unrest regarding Auer. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. 2156. Although the majority
reiterated the general Auer deference rule, it emphasized that there were limits as to when its deployment is
appropriate. Id. at 2166. And in the case before it, the majority trimmed the sails of Auer, holding that
“whatever the general merits of Auer deference, it is unwarranted here.” Id. at 2168; see also id. (citing Justice
Scalia’s concurring opinion in Talk America, Inc.).
55 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“[Justice Scalia’s opinion] raises serious
questions about the principle set forth in [Seminole Rock and Auer]. It may be appropriate to reconsider that
principle in an appropriate case.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 1339 (“Questions of Seminole Rock and
Auer deference arise as a matter of course on a regular basis. The bar is now aware that there is some interest
in reconsidering those cases, and has available to it a concise statement of the arguments on one side of the
issue.”).
56 Id. at 1339.
57 135 S. Ct. 1199.
58 Id. at 1203.
59 Id. at 1206.
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merely “interpretive” and thus carry the “force of law” which would require
the agencies to undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking.60
Justice Alito’s concurrence expresses sympathy for the D.C. Circuit’s
ill-fated attempt to add procedural requirements to the agency’s ability to issue
interpretive guidelines:
The [D.C. Circuit’s] creation of that doctrine [adding procedural
requirements] may have been prompted by an understandable
concern about the aggrandizement of the power of administrative
agencies as a result of the combined effect of (1) the effective
delegation to agencies by Congress of huge swaths of lawmaking
authority, (2) the exploitation by agencies of the uncertain boundary
between legislative and interpretive rules, and (3) this Court’s cases
holding that courts must ordinarily defer to an agency’s interpretation
of its own ambiguous regulations.61

Although brief, this concurrence firmly aligns Justice Alito with his
conservative core brethren regarding Auer.62 Closing on an ominous note,
Justice Alito remarks that he looks forward to a case in which the Court could
consider the doctrine’s validity “through full briefing and argument.”63
Justice Scalia, writing in a separate concurrence, likewise agrees with the
majority that “[t]he agency is free to interpret its own regulations with or
without notice and comment,” but added the proviso that “courts will decide—
with no deference to the agency—whether that interpretation is correct.”64
Justice Scalia takes this opportunity to continue his attack on Auer:
[T]here are weighty reasons to deny a lawgiver the power to write
ambiguous laws and then be the judge of what the ambiguity means. I
would therefore restore the balance originally struck by the APA with

60 Id. at 1208 n.4. The majority observed: “Even in cases where an agency’s interpretation receives Auer
deference, however, it is the court that ultimately decides whether a given regulation means what the agency
says. Moreover, Auer deference is not an inexorable command in all cases.” Id. (first citing Christopher v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012), with a parenthetical regarding the limitations on the scope
of Auer deference; and then citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994), with a quote
about conflicting agency interpretations being entitled to less weight than consistently held views).
61 Id. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
62 Id. at 1210–11.
63 Id. (“The opinions of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas offer substantial reasons why the Seminole
Rock doctrine may be incorrect. I await a case in which the validity of Seminole Rock may be explored through
full briefing and argument.” (citation omitted)).
64 Id. at 1213 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

SHARKEY GALLEYSPROOFS2

1720

6/16/2016 1:13 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:1705

respect to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations . . . by
abandoning Auer.65

Justice Thomas strikes out against Auer in his own opinion.66
Characterizing Auer deference as “a transfer of the judge’s exercise of
interpretive judgment to the agency,”67 Justice Thomas insists that courts
“exercise independent judgment in determining that a regulation properly
covers the conduct of regulated parties.”68 He further specifies that “[d]efining
the legal meaning of the regulation is one aspect of that determination.”69 Lest
the mortal danger to separation of powers be missed, Justice Thomas reminds:
Over a century before our War of Independence, the English
Civil War catapulted the theory of the separation of powers to
prominence. As political theorists of the day witnessed the conflict
between the King and Parliament, and the dangers of tyrannical
government posed by each, they began to call for a clear division of
authority between the two.70

The critique of Auer is but one prong of Justice Thomas’s attack on the
administrative state. It is here that Justice Thomas groups together “[m]any
decisions of this Court [that] invoke agency expertise as a justification for
deference,” an argument that “has its root in the support for administrative
agencies that developed during the Progressive Era in this country.”71 And the
Progressive Era, as we saw above, is notable (in Justice Thomas’s mind) for its
rejection of American “individualism,” its embrace of “a society organized for

65 Id. at 1212–13 (citing Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also id. at 1212 (distinguishing Auer from Chevron deference
and reiterating the separation-of-powers theory that he had advanced in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 243 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Justice Scalia elaborates:

Because the agency (not Congress) drafts the substantive rules that are the object of those
interpretations, giving them deference allows the agency to control the extent of its
notice-and-comment-free domain. To expand this domain, the agency need only write substantive
rules more broadly and vaguely, leaving plenty of gaps to be filled in later, using interpretive
rules unchecked by notice and comment.
Id.

66 Id. at 1214 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Only four years before Perez, Justice Thomas
authored the majority opinion in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., which laid the
groundwork for Justice Scalia’s revolt against Auer. 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2257 (2011); see also supra note 51.
67 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1219 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1215.
71 Id. at 1223 n.6.
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collective action,” its “deep disdain for . . . popular sovereignty,” and its
ushering in of the dreaded New Deal.72
2. Chevron Deference at Risk
Chief Justice Roberts has voiced these separation-of-powers concerns in
the context of Chevron deference. In City of Arlington v. FCC,73 the Court, in a
6–3 opinion authored by Justice Scalia, held that Chevron applies to an
agency’s claim to deference in interpreting its own statutory authority, refusing
to carve out a no-deference zone for “jurisdictional” issues.74 In a dissent
(joined by Justices Alito and Kennedy), Chief Justice Roberts characterizes
Chevron as “a powerful weapon in an agency’s regulatory arsenal,” and raises
wider concerns regarding “the fact that the administrative agencies, as a
practical matter, draw upon a potent brew of executive, legislative, and judicial
power.”75 Conceding that “[i]t would be a bit much to describe the result as
‘the very definition of tyranny,’” Chief Justice Roberts nonetheless emphasizes
that “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot
be dismissed.”76
The Chief Justice’s hostile view of Chevron deference is plain, but he was
in the minority in City of Arlington (joined only by fellow conservative core
Justices Thomas and Alito). When, however, the Chief Justice wrote for the
majority in King v. Burwell77—which involved a challenge to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act—he was joined by Justices Kennedy,
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, who hardly are prototypical
Chevron skeptics. In King, Chief Justice Roberts dispensed with Chevron in a
sentence, stating that it was inappropriate as applied to interpretive questions
72

Id.; see also supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
74 Id. at 1869–70 (“The reality, laid bare, is that there is no difference, insofar as the validity of agency
action is concerned, between an agency’s exceeding the scope of its authority (its ‘jurisdiction’) and its
exceeding authorized application of authority that it unquestionably has.”). Despite the hostility that he
developed toward Auer deference, Justice Scalia’s opinions stood firmly behind Chevron deference, which, by
Justice Scalia’s theory, does not introduce the same danger of self-aggrandizement. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw.
Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1340–42 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“While
the implication of an agency power to clarify the statute is reasonable enough, there is surely no congressional
implication that the agency can resolve ambiguities in its own regulations. For that would violate a
fundamental principle of separation of powers—that the power to write a law and the power to interpret it
cannot rest in the same hands.”).
75 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1886 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 1879 (first citing Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); and then citing Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012)).
77 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
73
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of such enormous importance.78 While the majority criticizes neither the merits
nor the wisdom of Chevron, the opinion nonetheless implicitly retreats from
Chevron by limiting the doctrine’s reach.79
Justice Thomas has launched a wholesale attack on Chevron in recent
years. In Michigan v. EPA,80 the Court—per Justice Scalia—held that the
emissions standards to regulate hazardous air pollutants emitted by
electricity-generating facilities promulgated by the EPA under the Clean Air
Act did not survive Chevron’s two-step test for judicial deference.81
Specifically, the majority reasons that, although “Chevron directs courts to
accept an agency’s reasonable resolution of an ambiguity in a statute that the
agency administers,” the EPA had failed to “operate within the bounds of
reasonable interpretation” by interpreting the statute to allow the EPA to
disregard costs when making a threshold decision about whether to regulate.82
In a separate concurrence, Justice Thomas draws upon earlier critiques of
Auer to challenge Chevron on separation-of-powers grounds.83 Justice Thomas
argues that the Chevron doctrine represents an abdication of courts’
constitutionally mandated role under Marbury v. Madison,84 as well as an
78 Id. at 2489 (“The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending
each year and affecting the price of health insurance for millions of people. Whether those credits are available
on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that is central to this
statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so
expressly.” (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014))).
79 See id. at 2488–89 (dispensing with Chevron in fewer than two hundred words). In support of his
conclusion, Chief Justice Roberts adds that it is particularly unlikely that Congress intended to delegate
interpretive authority on this point to the IRS given the agency’s lack of expertise in the area of health
insurance policymaking. Id. at 2489.
It is unclear to what extent Burwell represents a departure from the Court’s existing doctrine in this
area. In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Court recognized an “extraordinary cases” carve-out
to the standard Chevron analysis. 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000). But, as Michael Herz has remarked:

[Burwell] was a particularly robust application of the “major questions doctrine,” which holds
that judicial deference is out of place with regard to hugely significant policy questions—the sort
of issues that Congress should, or must, or can be presumed to, decide. Strikingly, the magnitude
of the issue did not simply keep the Court in “step one” of Chevron, it induced the Court to
jettison Chevron altogether.
Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1868–69 (2015).
80 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
81 Id. at 2707.
82 Id. (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2442).
83 Id. at 2712–14 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing, inter alia, Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct.
1199 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)).
84 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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unconstitutional delegation of Article I authority.85 Indeed, the fundamental
notion of deference to agency interpretations comes under fire in Thomas’s
opinion:
Perhaps there is some unique historical justification for deferring
to federal agencies, but these cases reveal how paltry an effort we
have made to understand it or to confine ourselves to its boundaries.
Although we hold today that EPA exceeded even the extremely
permissive limits on agency power set by our precedents, we should
be alarmed that it felt sufficiently emboldened by those precedents to
make the bid for deference that it did here. As in other areas of our
jurisprudence concerning administrative agencies, we seem to be
straying further and further from the Constitution without so much as
pausing to ask why. We should stop to consider that document before
blithely giving the force of law to any other agency “interpretations”
of federal statutes.86

In these recent opinions by the conservative core questioning the deference
and leeway given to agency interpretations of statutes and regulations, we have
the twenty-first-century version of cultural anxiety about the agglomeration of
federal power and expansion of the administrative state—anxiety that first
reared its head in the mid-twentieth century, in the days of Roscoe Pound.87
But, while Pound and the modern conservative core share deep antipathy
toward the administrative behemoth, they sharply diverge on the view of
common law torts as a regulatory alternative. Where Pound had praise for the
common law of torts, the modern conservative core displays an antagonism,
the intensity of which outflanks even that reserved for deference to agency
interpretation. This divergence is brought into sharp relief by the conservative
core’s views in cases involving federal preemption of state tort law, to which
we now turn.
B. Hostility to the Common Law of Torts
Conservative core Justices—whose ire is stoked by any agency
encroachment on judicial authority—are notably unfazed by agency

85

Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712–14.
Id. at 2413–14 (footnote omitted) (first citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 243 (2001)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); and then citing B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1310
(2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
87 See supra Part I.A.
86
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encroachment on the common law of torts.88 Preemption cases in the arenas of
pharmaceuticals and medical devices are particularly illustrative of this
phenomenon. Preemption, a notoriously muddled area of the law, defies
conventional modes of statutory interpretation.89 Most of the pharmaceutical
cases are implied preemption cases, involving statutes that lack explicit
instructions from Congress about the impact of the federal standards on state
law tort claims.90 Even when Congress does provide such express preemption
provisions, as it did in the Medical Device Amendments to the federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act,91 the language often is ambiguous.92 Thus, textual
analysis—even if it is one’s preferred (or exclusive) mode of statutory
interpretation—inevitably comes up short. Other guiding principles thus have
emerged as aids to preemption analysis: the “presumption against preemption”
default rule;93 policy preferences tilting in favor of regulation by the Food and
88 Sunstein and Vermeule provocatively depict several Supreme Court Justices’ “New Coke-style
concerns over unchecked delegation and executive aggrandizement at the expense of common-law baselines.”
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 39 (manuscript at 5). But they should draw a large caveat when it comes to
tort. Modern conservative core Justices—with the exception of Justice Thomas—seem content to push even
further back this common law baseline. See infra Part II.B.
89 See Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 5, at 453–54 (discussing recent shifts in
preemption jurisprudence away from the conventional approach to statutory interpretation); see also Richard
A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Introduction to FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL
INTERESTS 1, 1–3 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) (noting both the confused state of
modern preemption doctrine and the considerations beyond statutory interpretation involved in judicial
decisionmaking on preemption questions); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL
BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES 107 (2008) (observing, with respect to preemption doctrine, that
“[l]itigation across many fields of federal regulation has . . . yielded a great deal of inconsistent and muddled
law”).
90 See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2480 (2013) (observing that “the [Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act’s] treatment of prescription drugs includes neither an express pre-emption clause . . . nor an
express non-pre-emption clause”); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2586–87 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (noting the lack of express preemption clause in the 1984 Hatch–Waxman Amendments to the
FDCA); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009) (“If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to
its objectives, it surely would have enacted an express pre-emption provision [addressing prescription drug
standards] at some point during the FDCA’s 70-year history.”). See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Against
Freewheeling, Extratextual Obstacle Preemption: Is Justice Clarence Thomas the Lone Principled
Federalist?, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 63, 84–93 (2010) (discussing the confusion inherent in the Supreme
Court’s modern implied preemption jurisprudence).
91 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012).
92 See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 321–30 (2008) (construing the scope and effect of
an express preemption clause in the FDCA as modified by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976);
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001) (resolving a preemption dispute on
implied preemption grounds, despite the existence of an express preemption provision in the statute at issue).
93 See, e.g., Levine, 555 U.S. at 575 (discussing and applying the presumption against preemption); see
also Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 5, at 455–59 (examining the force of the presumption
in major modern preemption cases). See generally Mendelson, supra note 5 (arguing that the presumption
against preemption should be expanded upon in cases involving administrative agencies). The presumption
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Drug Administration (FDA) or via tort liability;94 and what I have termed the
“agency reference” model, whereby courts scrutinize input from the FDA
regarding the optimal balance of safety regulation and tort liability, specifically
examining the potential for tort claims to undermine the relevant federal
regulatory goals.95
From a jurisprudence perspective, these interpretive doctrines can point in
opposite directions.96 For example, the “presumption against preemption”
might counsel against a finding of federal preemption in the areas of health and
safety, which historically were regulated by the states;97 whereas the
Chevron/Skidmore98 and Auer doctrines of agency deference might suggest, in
the same case, that the court should defer to an agency’s position that its
regulation preempts state law tort claims.99 From an ideological perspective,

against preemption is said to be particularly forceful in cases in which the federal law applies to an area that
traditionally has been regulated by the states. Levine, 555 U.S. at 565.
94 See, e.g., Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2485 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (highlighting the victim-compensation
function traditionally fulfilled by common law tort claims and arguing that because the statutory provision at
issue failed to serve this function, the federal standard should not be understood to preempt such claims).
95 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 DUKE L.J.
2125, 2146–55 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, Federalism Accountability] (describing the “agency reference
model” of preemption jurisprudence); Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth”: Heightened Judicial
Review in the Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1589, 1639–40 (2014) [hereinafter Sharkey,
State Farm “With Teeth”] (providing an overview of the agency reference mode of analysis); see also Kent
Barnett, Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise with Chevmore Codification, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 587,
594–96 (2014) (discussing the “agency reference” approach).
96 See generally Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 5, at 484 (noting the cross-cutting
nature of the various abstract considerations involved in preemption doctrine).
97 See Levine, 555 U.S. at 565 n.3 (asserting that the presumption against preemption applies in cases
involving state health and safety regulations); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (observing
“the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety”).
98 In Skidmore v. Swift & Co.—a case that preceded Chevron by several decades—the Supreme Court
held that courts are not required to defer to administrative agencies’ interpretations of statutes that they
administer, but that courts may give some weight to these interpretations on a case-by-case basis, depending in
each case on “the thoroughness evident in [the interpretation’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.” 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Following the Court’s establishment of a more
deferential approach to agency rulemaking in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984), a string of cases allowed the Court to elaborate upon the Skidmore/Chevron dichotomy
and to clarify when each kind of deference will apply. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218
(2001); see also Eskridge & Baer, supra note 44, at 1085–88 (discussing how the Court has developed the
Skidmore/Chevron framework).
99 See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 739 (2004) (“When faced
with an agency interpretation addressing a statute’s preemptive effect, courts have trod unevenly in reconciling
Chevron deference with the . . . presumption against preemption.”); Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption,
supra note 5, at 491–99 (examining the interplay between the presumption against preemption and Chevron
deference).
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preemption cases often involve a clash between anti-preemption federalism
values that would privilege the scope of state-level regulation, on the one hand,
and pro-preemption libertarian or de-regulatory impulses that would evince a
preference for one regulator over two, and that may also include an overall
skepticism regarding juries, on the other.100 Here, however, I am interested in
exploring a different thread: the extent to which the conservative core Justices’
attack on Auer and Chevron deference, and wider distaste for and distrust of
the administrative state, is suspended in federal preemption cases, given the
doctrines of agency deference that are implicated.
Perhaps the most striking illustration of this seeming inconsistency in the
preemption context can be found in the conservative core’s vehement dissent
in Wyeth v. Levine.101 In that case, the Supreme Court majority, in an opinion
by Justice Stevens, held that a plaintiff’s state law failure-to-warn claim
against brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturer Wyeth was not preempted,
even though the FDA had specifically approved the warning label on the
drug.102 In reaching its decision, the majority acknowledged that the FDA had
stated—in a preamble to a regulation on the content and format of drug
labels—that the regulation would preclude liability under state tort law.103
Citing Skidmore, the majority explains that “[t]he weight we accord the
agency’s explanation of state law’s impact on the federal scheme depends on
its thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness.”104 Applying this standard
to the case at hand, the majority concludes that the FDA’s preemption
preamble was “entitled to no weight,” emphasizing the fact that the agency had
reversed its position on the preemption question,105 without giving the states or
interested parties any opportunity to participate in the public
notice-and-comment process.106
100 See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008) (raising serious doubts as to whether a
jury would be able to assess accurately the costs and benefits of an allegedly defective medical device);
Richard L. Cupp Jr., Preemption’s Rise (and Bit of a Fall) as Products Liability Reform: Wyeth, Riegel,
Altria, and the Restatement (Third)’s Prescription Product Design Defect Standard, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 727,
753–54 (2009) (exploring the role that mistrust of civil juries has played in recent Supreme Court preemption
decisions); Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth,” supra note 95, at 1636 (discussing the role that libertarian
impulses and other abstract factors may play in preemption analysis); Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of
the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 342
(discussing these cross-cutting considerations).
101 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
102 Id. at 581.
103 Id. at 575.
104 Id. at 577 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
105 Id. at 581.
106 Id. at 577. The majority elaborates:
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In a very heated dissent, Justice Alito (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Scalia) emphatically rejects the majority’s position, which he
characterizes as “hold[ing] that a state tort jury, rather than the [FDA], is
ultimately responsible for regulating warning labels for prescription drugs.”107
Moreover, the dissent accuses the majority of ignoring the critical question of
“who—the FDA or a jury in Vermont—has the authority and responsibility for
determining the ‘adequacy’ of [a prescription drug’s] warnings.”108 Turning up
the temperature even further, the dissent accuses the majority of “turning a
common-law tort suit into a ‘frontal assault’ on the FDA’s regulatory regime
for drug labeling.”109
The dissent, moreover, explicitly chastises the majority for not “relying on
the FDA’s explanation of its own regulatory purposes”110 and for refusing to
give weight to the agency’s position. Indeed, the level of deference the dissent
appears willing to give to the FDA is striking and far-reaching. The dissent
claims that it is not necessary for an agency’s preamble to have “force of law”
in order to merit deference.111 To the contrary, according to the dissenting
Justices, the reviewing court can and should rely on “materials other than the
Secretary’s regulation to explain the conflict between state and federal law.”112
When the FDA issued its notice of proposed rulemaking in December 2000, it explained that the
rule would “not contain policies that have federalism implications or that preempt State law.” In
2006, the agency finalized the rule and, without offering States or other interested parties notice
or opportunity for comment, articulated a sweeping position on the FDCA’s pre-emptive effect in
the regulatory preamble. The agency’s views on state law are inherently suspect in light of this
procedural failure.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drugs and Biologics, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,082 (Dec. 22, 2000); Requirements for Prescription Drug Product
Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,103 (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 201)).
107 Id. at 604 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 607 (“Congress made its ‘purpose’ plain in authorizing
the FDA—not state tort juries—to determine when and under what circumstances a drug is ‘safe.’”).
108 Id. at 605. And here, the dissenting Justices claim, nearly rhetorically: “[T]he real issue is whether a
state tort jury can countermand the FDA’s considered judgment that [the prescription drug’s] FDA-mandated
warning label renders it[] . . . ‘safe.’” Id.
109 Id. at 606 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 21, Levine,
555 U.S. 555 (No. 06-1249)).
110 Id. at 625 (“[T]he FDA’s explanation of the conflict between state tort suits and the federal labeling
regime, set forth in the agency’s amicus brief, is not even mentioned in the Court’s opinion. Instead of relying
on the FDA’s explanation of its own regulatory purposes, the Court relies on a decade-old and now-repudiated
statement, which the majority finds preferable.”).
111 Id. at 623.
112 Id. (observing prior instances in which members of the Court had “emphasiz[ed] that the FDA has a
‘special understanding of the likely impact of both state and federal requirements, as well as an understanding
of whether (or the extent to which) state requirements may interfere with federal objectives,’ and that ‘[t]he
FDA can translate these understandings into particularized pre-emptive intentions . . . through statements in
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This expansive view of deference to the underlying regulator is not easily
reconciled with the conservative core’s attack on the administrative state in
general; indeed, it is striking when considered alongside the dissenting
Justices’ hostility toward Auer and Skidmore/Chevron deference in particular.
Any such reading would be very difficult to reconcile with these Justices’
repeated criticisms of the fourth branch, or the body of case law outside the
preemption context in which they have tried to curtail administrative agencies’
power.113
The conservative core’s willingness to accede to the federal regulator (at
least when it concerns the FDA and pharmaceuticals)—putting out of mind the
administrative behemoth or any yearning to return to common law baselines—
ostensibly has little to do with acceptance of the modern administrative state.
Rather, as is corroborated by language in the dissent itself, the conservative
core’s position is best understood as a reflection of the Justices’ evident
hostility toward the common law of torts as a regulator in this domain:
By their very nature, juries are ill equipped to perform the FDA’s
cost–benefit-balancing function. . . . [J]uries tend to focus on the risk
of a particular product’s design or warning label that arguably
contributed to a particular plaintiff’s injury, not on the overall
benefits of that design or label; “the patients who reaped those
benefits are not represented in court.” Indeed, patients like
respondent are the only ones whom tort juries ever see, and for a
patient like respondent—who has already suffered a tragic accident—
[the drug’s] risks are no longer a matter of probabilities and
potentialities.
In contrast, the FDA has the benefit of the long view. Its
drug-approval determinations consider the interests of all potential
users of a drug, including “those who would suffer without new
medical [products]” if juries in all 50 States were free to contradict
the FDA’s expert determinations. And the FDA conveys its warnings
with one voice, rather than whipsawing the medical community with
50 (or more) potentially conflicting ones. After today’s ruling,
however, parochialism may prevail.114

“regulations, preambles, interpretive statements, and responses to comments”’” (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 506 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (alterations in
original))).
113 See supra Part II.A.
114 Levine, 555 U.S. at 626 (Alito, J., dissenting) (third alteration in original) (first quoting Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008); and then quoting id. at 326).
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This same hostility toward regulation by tort litigation permeates Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion in a prior medical-device preemption case, Riegel v.
Medtronic.115 In that case, the Court held that the express preemption provision
of the Medical Device Amendments to the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
barred common law tort claims challenging the safety and effectiveness of a
medical device that had been granted pre-market approval by the FDA.116
Although Justice Scalia ostensibly relies on a textual analysis of the statutory
preemption provision, his opinion strays far beyond this realm to various issues
implicating regulatory policy—namely, tort liability as a substitute for safety
regulation—and institutional design—namely, the question whether an agency
or court should be the one to decide preemption questions.117
In this face-off, as framed by Justice Scalia, the common law of torts is a
poor regulatory substitute for the “rigorous” FDA pre-market approval process,
which requires that the FDA “spend[] an average of 1,200 hours reviewing
each application [by the manufacturer]”; this review includes “full reports of
all studies and investigations of the device’s safety and effectiveness.”118 Nor
does the common law of torts fare well as compared to state regulatory
alternatives:
A state statute, or a regulation adopted by a state agency, could at
least be expected to apply cost–benefit analysis similar to that applied
by the experts at the FDA: How many more lives will be saved by a
device which, along with its greater effectiveness, brings a greater
risk of harm? A jury, on the other hand, sees only the cost of a more
dangerous design, and is not concerned with its benefits; the patients
who reaped those benefits are not represented in court.119

Continuing in this vein, Justice Scalia speculates that “the solicitude for those
injured by FDA-approved devices . . . was overcome in Congress’s estimation
by solicitude for those who would suffer without new medical devices if juries
were allowed to apply the tort law of 50 States to all innovations.”120
115

552 U.S. 312.
Id. at 330.
117 Id. at 323–30. For more discussion, see Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA
Preemption of State Law Products Liability Claims, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2009).
118 Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317–18.
119 Id. at 325.
120 Id. at 326. This comment provokes Justice Stevens:
116

There is nothing in the preenactment history of the MDA suggesting that Congress thought state
tort remedies had impeded the development of medical devices. Nor is there any evidence at all
to suggest that Congress decided that the cost of injuries from Food and Drug
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Here again, the conservative core ostensibly is able to tolerate the
encroachment of the federal regulatory state, at least where the victim is the
common law of torts. In Riegel, the majority does not expressly rely on
deference to the FDA; but the deference doctrines are invoked, and there is
nary a whiff of protest by the conservative core. With respect to
Chevron/Skidmore, Justice Scalia merely notes that “[i]n the case before us, the
FDA has supported the position taken by our opinion with regard to the
meaning of the statute,” though it was “unnecessary to rely upon that agency
view because we think the statute itself speaks clearly to the point at issue.”121
Likewise, with respect to Auer, Justice Scalia’s attitude towards the agency’s
position would appear to be agnostic, given the clarity of the text of the
statutory preemption provision.122 It is nevertheless noteworthy that Justice
Scalia, having invoked conventional Auer deference,123 issues no tirade against
the doctrine. Yet, again, this occurs in a case in which refusing to defer to the
agency would “save” the common law of torts.
Thus far, as concerns both the campaign to scale back judicial deference to
agencies124 and the exception thereto carved out for deference to the FDA in
federal preemption decisions, I have treated the conservative core Justices as a
unified bloc. But Justice Thomas has staked out his very own contrarian
position in implied preemption cases such as Wyeth v. Levine—a position that
vests his hostile attitudes toward agencies (both inside and outside the context
of preemption cases) with a consistency that his conservative colleagues’

Administration-approved medical devices was outweighed “by solicitude for those who would
suffer without new medical devices if juries were allowed to apply the tort law of 50 States to all
innovations.” That is a policy argument advanced by the Court, not by Congress.
Id. at 331 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting id. at 326 (majority
opinion)).
121 Id. at 326 (majority opinion). Justice Scalia (albeit in dicta) goes further to suggest that the FDA’s
position might be accorded Skidmore deference, and if so, then the fact that the agency had changed its earlier
position would likely weaken the deference owed. Id. at 326–27 (“If, however, we had found the statute
ambiguous and had accorded the agency’s current position deference, the dissent is correct that—inasmuch as
mere Skidmore deference would seemingly be at issue—the degree of deference might be reduced by the fact
that the agency’s earlier position was different.” (citation omitted) (citing, inter alia, Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134 (1944))).
122 Id. at 329–30 (“Neither accepting nor rejecting the proposition that this regulation can properly be
consulted to determine the statute’s meaning; and neither accepting nor rejecting the FDA’s [interpretation of
the regulation]; the regulation fails to alter our interpretation of the text insofar as the outcome of this case is
concerned.”).
123 Id. at 328 (“The agency’s reading of its own rule is entitled to substantial deference.” (citing Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997))).
124 See supra Part II.A.
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approach lacks.125 In a separate opinion in Levine, Justice Thomas announced
that he would no longer support implied obstacle preemption,126 a form of
federal preemption by which a court must consider whether the state law in
question frustrates the “purposes and objectives” of the relevant federal
regulatory scheme.127 Justice Thomas points out that it is here, untethered from
statutory text, that courts look to “Congressional and agency musings” to
discern such conflicts, and he objects that these sources do not satisfy the
Article I, Section Seven requirements for the enactment of federal law and thus
cannot preempt state law.128 Justice Thomas stands alone—and distinguishes
himself from the conservative core—in eschewing any reliance on “agency
comments, regulatory history, and agency litigating positions” in implied
preemption analysis.129 In his case, hostility to the administrative state points
toward an anti-preemption direction in Levine; unlike the rest of the
conservative core, he holds firm to the position that “no agency . . . can
pre-empt a State’s judgment by merely musing about goals or intentions not
found within or authorized by the statutory text.”130
Note, however, that even here there is a chink in Justice Thomas’s
resistance to the administrative state: the puzzling persistence of Auer
deference in the preemption context. Overlooking this issue led to
over-exuberance on the part of the liberal consumer groups who, in the wake
of Levine, embraced Justice Thomas as the new standard bearer for the
anti-preemption position.131 But then along came PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, in
which Justice Thomas, re-joined by his fellow conservative core Justices
(along with Justice Kennedy), held that state tort failure-to-warn claims

125

See generally Sharkey, supra note 90 (discussing Justice Thomas’s obstacle preemption
jurisprudence).
126 Justice Thomas explained:
I have become increasingly skeptical of this Court’s “purposes and objectives” pre-emption
jurisprudence. Under this approach, the Court routinely invalidates state laws based on perceived
conflicts with broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of
congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal law. Because implied
pre-emption doctrines that wander far from the statutory text are inconsistent with the
Constitution, I concur only in the judgment.
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
127 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
128 Levine, 555 U.S. at 587–88 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
129 Id. at 598–99.
130 Id. at 600–01.
131 See David G. Savage, Clarence Thomas, Supreme Court Liberal?, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/08/nation/na-thomas8.
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brought against a generic drug manufacturer were barred under the doctrine of
implied impossibility preemption.132
Central to the holding in Mensing—and specific to generic drug
manufacturers, as opposed to brand-name manufacturers such as that involved
in Levine—is the generic drug manufacturer’s federal duty of “sameness,”
namely, the requirement that a generic drug label be exactly the same as that of
the corresponding brand-name drug.133 In light of this requirement, the
conservative core Justices, in an opinion for the Court, held that it would be
“impossible” for a generic drug manufacturer to add a warning to its label
without violating federal law.134 To reach this conclusion, the majority defers
to the FDA’s interpretation regarding the agency’s obligations under its own
regulations: “The FDA . . . tells us that it interprets its regulations to require
that the warning labels of a brand-name drug and its generic copy must always
be the same—thus, generic drug manufacturers have an ongoing federal duty
of ‘sameness.’”135 In so doing, these Justices do not hesitate to invoke Auer
deference repeatedly, emphasizing that “[t]he FDA’s views are ‘controlling
unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s]’ or there is any
other reason to doubt that they reflect the FDA’s fair and considered
judgment.”136
The conservative core Justices, again joined by Justice Kennedy, implicitly
rallied behind Auer deference in a subsequent preemption case, Mutual
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett,137 once more showing no qualms where the
132

131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577–78 (2011).
Id. at 2574–75 (describing generic drug companies’ “ongoing federal duty of ‘sameness’”).
134 Id. at 2578.
135 Id. at 2574–75 (first citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 16,
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (No. 09-993); and then citing Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations,
57 Fed. Reg. 17,961 (Apr. 28, 1992) (“[T]he [generic drug’s] labeling must be the same as the listed drug
product’s labeling because the listed drug product is the basis for [generic drug] approval.” (alterations in
original))); id. at 2575 (“The FDA denies that the Manufacturers could have used the [process available to
brand name manufacturers] to unilaterally strengthen their warning labels.”).
136 Id. at 2575 (second alteration in original) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1997)); see
also id. at 2575 (“We defer to the FDA’s interpretation of its [brand name labeling regulation] and generic
labeling regulations. Although Mensing and Demahy offer other ways to interpret the regulations, we do not
find the agency’s interpretation ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’ Nor do Mensing and
Demahy suggest there is any other reason to doubt the agency’s reading.” (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461)); id.
at 2576 (“As with the [brand name labeling] regulation, we defer to the FDA [that federal law does not permit
manufacturers to issue additional warnings via “Dear Doctor” letters]. Mensing and Demahy offer no
argument that the FDA’s interpretation is plainly erroneous.” (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 461)). Justice Thomas
adds this significant caveat: “Although we defer to the agency’s interpretation of its regulations, we do not
defer to an agency’s ultimate conclusion about whether state law should be pre-empted.” Id. at 2575 n.3.
137 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
133
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doctrine’s application meant preempting common law design defect tort claims
against a generic drug manufacturer. Justice Alito penned the majority opinion,
which relies on federal drug regulations “as interpreted by the FDA” in
deeming state law preempted.138
When juxtaposed with the conservative core Justices’ efforts to stymie the
growth and influence of the administrative state by reining in agency discretion
and refusing to accord deference under Auer and Chevron/Skidmore,139 the
conservative core’s preemption jurisprudence is remarkable in two ways. First,
the Justices apparently sublimate any hostility, or even hesitancy, toward
according deference to the FDA, particularly when considering the agency’s
interpretation of its own regulations under Auer.140 Second—and more
controversially—it would appear that these Justices’ hostility toward the
common law of torts trumps even their caustic criticism of the ever-inflating
administrative state.141 What this suggests is that the conservative core’s
position departs significantly from the conventional view embodied in Pound’s
work142—namely, the view that staving off the administrative state inexorably
leads to a flourishing of the common law. Moreover, a more constructive
approach will be needed to overcome these Justices’ resistance to the common
law, given the conservative core’s greater evident opposition to regulation via
tort law.
III. A REGULATORY RECONCILIATION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The advent of the modern administrative state, and the resulting changes to
the legal landscape, mandate a revised approach to the common law and to
statutory interpretation. The common law of torts has undergone such
fundamental reformatting before. It was changed in the twentieth century to
address the trend of “statutorification,” that is, legislatures’ enactment of laws
that changed the common law baselines. As did Roscoe Pound and Guido
Calabresi, we should reject the notion of “common-law chauvinism,”143 that is,
138

Id. at 2476 (quoting Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2577).
See supra Part II.A.
140 See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2476; Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574–75; Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 625
(2009) (Alito, J., dissenting); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326–27 (2008).
141 See supra notes 114–24 and accompanying text (discussing the conservative core’s criticism of
regulation by juries in agency tort preemption cases).
142 See supra Part I.
143 See WITT, supra note 13, at 257; see also CALABRESI, supra note 12, at 163 (disclaiming any desire for
a “nostalgic restoration of courts as the primary makers of law”). Note that, with respect to Pound, this
statement is a bit fraught. In his later work (explored above in Part I.A), Pound became committed to the idea
139
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we should avoid fetishizing the common law at the expense of statutory and
administrative law. Drawing inspiration from the visions of Pound and
Calabresi in the twentieth century, the task before us in the twenty-first century
is to chart a new course for courts—namely, one whereby they effectively
incorporate input from federal agencies, while at the same time ensuring that
such agencies do not overreach.
Unlike the conservative core Justices (outside the drug and medical device
preemption context), I do not believe that this necessarily entails a wholesale
rejection of agency interpretive authority. Instead, courts must exercise
oversight over a reformatted common law landscape that incorporates
significant input from federal regulatory agencies.
A. Regulatory Substitutes: Rejecting Common Law Chauvinism
The conventional take on the threat of the administrative state to the
common law of torts embraces—explicitly or implicitly—a view of the
administrative state and the common law as regulatory substitutes (and
competitors). According to this perspective, if the administrative state is
resisted, the common law will flourish in the open regulatory space. There is
good reason, however, to look with skepticism upon this approach. This view
not only is suspect in light of the Supreme Court’s modern federal preemption
jurisprudence, as described above, but it also risks a kind of “common-law
chauvinism” that is ill-suited for regulation in the twenty-first century.
Pound, in his early work at the turn of the twentieth century144—somewhat
ironically, given his later work145—and Calabresi, more than a half-century
later,146 proposed a response to statutory and administrative growth. Both
rejected “common-law chauvinism” and proposed a forward-looking way to
integrate the reality of the increasing proliferation of statutes and regulations in
the United States.

that the common law was superior and administration was evil. As Witt aptly notes: “As the Cold War set in,
Pound’s critique of administration embraced ever more fervently the kinds of common-law chauvinism he had
rejected decades earlier.” WITT, supra note 13, at 257. In this Part, I rely on the approach Pound championed
in his earlier work.
144 See POUND, supra note 34, at 175–76 (endorsing a dynamic and interactive system by which both the
courts and the legislature would play critically important roles in efficient legal administration).
145 See supra Part I.B.
146 See CALABRESI, supra note 12.
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1. Roscoe Pound’s Common Law and Legislation
Pound’s 1908 essay Common Law and Legislation begins: “Not the least
notable characteristics of American law today are the excessive output of
legislation in all our jurisdictions and the indifference, if not contempt, with
which that output is regarded by courts and lawyers.”147 But Pound stands firm
against the “fashionable” practice of “preach[ing] the superiority of
judge-made law.”148 He recognizes that “‘[t]he capital fact in the mechanism of
modern states is the energy of legislatures.’”149
In his early career, Pound—later so nostalgic for the common law—was
actually highly critical of the common law, and all the more so when it turned
a blind eye to legislative developments. His early work questions the common
law’s very ability to protect health and safety in the modern industrial age.150
According to Pound, the common law was “not equal to the task” of
twentieth-century health and safety regulation.151 Moreover, he maintained that
“American constitutionalism had wrongly favored common-law institutions
where more efficient administrative management was required.”152 Witt,
having taken a close look at his writings, both formal and informal, reports:
Everywhere one turned, Pound wrote, “commissions and boards, with
summary administrative and inquisitorial powers are called for, and
courts are distrusted.” Such modern imperatives as “public utilities,
factory inspection, food inspection, tenement-house inspection, and
building laws,” Pound concluded, had compelled the United States to
turn more and more from traditional legal institutions to new forms of
“administrative prevention.” In each of these areas, Pound believed,
experts would be able to transform the “legal ordering of society”
into “a great series of tasks of social engineering” to be “worked out
in the sociological laboratory.153

147

Pound, supra note 11, at 383.
Id. at 383–84.
149 Id. at 403 (quoting HENRY SUMMER MAINE, Sovereignty and Empire, in LECTURES ON THE EARLY
HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS 371, 398 (1874)).
150 See, e.g., POUND, supra note 34, at 190 (“A body of law which will satisfy the demands of the society
of today cannot be made of the ultra-individualist materials of eighteenth-century jurisprudence and
nineteenth-century common law based thereon, no matter how judges are chosen or how often they are
dismissed.”).
151 See id.; see also WITT, supra note 13, at 223.
152 WITT, supra note 13, at 223 (quoting Roscoe Pound, Address Before the Annual Convention of the
American Bar Association (Aug. 29, 1906), in 14 AM. L. REV. 445, 445 (1906)).
153 Id. at 221 (first quoting Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, 18 GREEN BAG 17, 19 (1906);
then quoting Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARV. L. REV. 302, 323
148
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Most significantly, in Common Law and Legislation, Pound criticizes the
then-prevailing judicial practice of strictly reading statutes in derogation of the
common law.154 Indeed, his work on the subject is the classic criticism of
nineteenth-century courts’ adoption of this practice.155 Pound took a
revolutionary stand against the prevailing eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
view that heralded common law judges as uniquely able to discern the legal
framework, and that further vested those judges with essentially sole authority
to change that framework when they saw fit.156 Against this ingrained
orthodoxy, Pound argues that statutes should be given full effect, unhampered
by cramped judicial interpretation, even if they alter the common law.157
2. Guido Calabresi’s A Common Law for the Age of Statutes
Pound might be seen as the progenitor of, or at least an inspiration for,
Guido Calabresi’s A Common Law for the Age of Statutes. Calabresi opens his
book, written in 1982, with this observation: “The last fifty to eighty years
have seen a fundamental change in American law. In this time we have gone
from a legal system dominated by the common law, divined by courts, to one
in which statutes, enacted by legislatures, have become the primary source of
law.”158 The opening chapter, “Choking on Statutes,” attests to the
proliferation at the time of statutory and regulatory mandates, especially in
health and safety, with more than a hint of the prevailing resistance thereto by
common law loyalists.159
Like Pound, Calabresi rejects nostalgic wistfulness for “a return to the pure
golden age of the common law, before the orgy of statute making.”160
(1913); and then quoting Pound, supra note 11, at 406–07). With respect to Pound’s early work, as Witt notes,
“Frankfurter and the New Dealers among his students—men like James Landis and Thomas Corcoran—
continued for decades to draw on Pound’s ideas to establish new administrative institutions in the American
state.” Id. at 228.
154 Pound, supra note 11, at 387.
155 See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, ELEMENTS OF LEGISLATION 38 n.46 (2013) (highlighting Pound as a
proponent of this position); Guido Calabresi, Being Honest About Being Honest Agents, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 907, 907–08 (2010) (citing Pound in criticizing the “derogation” canon).
156 See, e.g., POUND, supra note 34, at 190–91 (endorsing a departure from the eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century elevation of the common law).
157 See id.; see also CALABRESI, supra note 12, at 75 n.20 (noting Pound’s approach to the role of statutes
vis-à-vis the role of the common law).
158 CALABRESI, supra note 12, at 1; see also id. at 5 (“[S]tarting with the Progressive Era but with
increasing rapidity since the New Deal, we have become a nation governed by written laws.”).
159 Id. at 1–7.
160 Id. at 69; see GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 40 (1977) (“No golden age endures
forever . . . .”). According to Gilmore, in the early nineteenth century, “pure Mansfieldianism flourished: not

SHARKEY GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

6/16/2016 1:13 PM

ADMINISTRATIVE STATE AND THE COMMON LAW

1737

Calabresi did not want “to turn back the clock and make courts the primary
agents of lawmaking and law reform.”161 Instead, he reconceptualized the role
of courts in light of “the slow adaptation of our whole legal-political system to
a major change: the preponderance of statutory law.”162
Following the spirit of Pound’s accommodation of legislation into the
common law, Calabresi provided a new framework that aimed to recast
judicial interpretation in the twentieth century to increase the courts’ capacity
to deal with the “statutorification” of the American legal system.163 He
celebrates the common law, but in a reimagined form, far from the shopworn
nineteenth-century version.164
B. Regulatory Complements: Embracing Judicial Oversight of the
Administrative State
Pound—particularly in his later work—feared the administrative
behemoth;165 and Calabresi, too, showed some wariness of regulation by
federal agencies.166 But even as Pound decried “administrative absolutism”—
only were his cases regularly cited but his lighthearted disregard for precedent, his joyous acceptance of the
idea that judges are supposed to make law—the more the better—became a notable feature of our early
jurisprudence.” Id. at 24. Nor is this nostalgia limited to this side of the Atlantic. See, e.g., PATRICK DEVLIN,
SAMPLES OF LAWMAKING 6 (1962) (“The work done by the judges of England is not now as glorious as it
was.”); see also id. at 117 (“At its best the common law is, I think, better than any statute could be.”).
161 CALABRESI, supra note 12, at 73. He was not interested in such a “nostalgic restoration of courts as the
primary makers of law, in our system.” Id. at 163.
162 Id. at 2.
163 Id. at 1–2 (describing the effects of the “‘statutorification’ of American law”).
164 More specifically, Calabresi insists that a significant common law judicial function is the updating of
outworn laws. Under Calabresi’s view, this is a key role for the common law: “It is no more and no less than
the critical task of deciding when a retentionist or revisionist bias is appropriately applied to an existing
statutory or common law rule.” Id. at 164 (emphasis omitted).
165 There is a great deal of hostile rhetoric associated with Pound’s name. See WITT, supra note 13, at
232; see also WILLRICH, supra note 18, at 315–16 (discussing Pound’s “thunderous assault on the New Deal
state”); supra Part I.A. This view is difficult to reconcile with Pound’s earlier embrace of the administrative
state as a critical part of a legal system that could keep pace with the country’s needs following the rise of
industry. See Pound, supra note 34, at 330–31 (examining the administrative state’s role in the legal system);
Pound et al., supra note 30, at 331–34 (observing, inter alia, that agencies must have the authority to
promulgate rules in order to effectively carry out their responsibilities); see also ERNST, supra note 27, at 135–
36.
166 Calabresi devotes one chapter of A Common Law for the Age of Statutes to the delegation of
substantial authority to administrative agencies. He would give a role to agencies (albeit a limited one) to work
in conjunction with courts and legislatures to renovate the law. CALABRESI, supra note 12, at 44–58.
Nonetheless, according to Calabresi:
The very things that make administrative agencies reasonably adept at sensing current popular
will—such as the existence of staff and therefore of budgetary dependence on elected officials—
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and saw grave danger in unchecked agency authority—he nonetheless
supported a framework by which the courts would oversee agencies through
the exercise of judicial review, thereby providing the necessary check on
unprincipled agency action. In this vein, Pound endorsed pre-APA legislation
that would have given the courts somewhat greater oversight over the
administrative state.167 His chief fear, properly understood, was of unchecked
discretion rather than of the entrenchment of the administrative state per se.168
A similar chord is struck by some of the conservative core Supreme Court
Justices. In his City of Arlington dissent, for example, Chief Justice Roberts
posits that the antidote to the threat posed by the administrative states is a
judiciary ready and willing to police agency action. Chief Justice Roberts
would have courts exercise strict oversight to prevent agency overreach.169
This call for enhanced judicial scrutiny, however, is drowned out amidst
the wider, all-out attack on the rise of the administrative state per the modern
conservative core of the Supreme Court.170 Moreover, it is apparently
abandoned or forgotten altogether in the context of the drug and
medical-device preemption cases.171 This apparent carve-out, I would argue, is
contrary to the principle—otherwise generally espoused by the conservative
also make them ill suited to the task of discerning principles and call into question the
disinterestedness of their judgments on the rightness of a statute.
Id. at 110–11.
167 United States Court of Appeals for Administration: Hearings before a Subcomm. on the Judicary on S.
3676, 75th Cong. 169–86 (1938) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 3637] (statement of Dean Roscoe Pound, Harvard
Law School); ERNST, supra note 27, at 135–36; Letter from Roscoe Pound, Dean, Harvard Law Sch., to
Edward R. Burke, U.S. Senator (May 18, 1940), reprinted in Logan-Walter Bill Supported by Dean Pound,
AM. L. & LAW., May 25, 1940, at 1, 6.
168 Hearings on S. 3637, supra note 167, at 182 (conceiving of courts as responsible for ensuring that
agencies remain within their “legal limits”); see also Mark Tushnet, Administrative Law in the 1930s: The
Supreme Court’s Accommodation of Progressive Legal Theory, 60 DUKE L.J. 1565, 1631 n.399 (2011)
(asserting that “Pound wanted ‘a simple, direct, and inexpensive mode of review’” (quoting Daniel R. Ernst,
Roscoe Pound and the Administrative State 100 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal))); Letter from Roscoe Pound to Edward R. Burke, supra note 167, at 1 (emphasizing the virtues of a
“simple, expeditious, non-technical mode of review of administrative determinations”).
169 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1885–86 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“What is afoot,
according to the Court, is a judicial power-grab, with nothing less than ‘Chevron itself’ as ‘the ultimate
target.’”). Chief Justice Roberts concedes that “[t]he Court touches on a legitimate concern: Chevron
importantly guards against the Judiciary arrogating to itself policymaking properly left, under the separation of
powers, to the Executive.” Id. at 1886. “But,” the Chief Justice continues, “there is another concern at play, no
less firmly rooted in our constitutional structure. That is the obligation of the Judiciary not only to confine
itself to its proper role, but to ensure that the other branches do so as well.” Id.
170 See supra Part II.A.
171 See supra Part II.B.
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core—that judicial oversight must provide an effective safeguard against
overbroad exercises of agency authority.
As I have argued in a series of articles, courts should exercise particularly
stringent judicial review in the context of federal preemption of the common
law of torts.172 By this view, the Levine majority was justified in withholding
deference to the FDA on the grounds that the agency’s pro-preemption position
lacked empirical grounding, and that the agency failed to vet its position via
the notice-and-comment procedure for administrative rulemaking.173
Moreover, heightened judicial scrutiny of agency preemptive rules is
especially necessary in light of the fact that such agency decisions are not
typically subject to rigorous executive oversight.174
Judicial oversight of the administrative state holds promise, too, for
encouraging “tort–agency partnerships” in health and safety regulation.175
Under this approach, the administrative state and the common law can operate,
in certain contexts, as regulatory complements—and courts must solicit input
from regulatory agencies. However, courts must then scrutinize such input to
ensure that there is empirical backing for any claims that, for example,
common law tort regulation cannot co-exist with administrative regulation.
This system of judicial review allows for the active moderation of the interplay
between federal regulations and the common law of torts, and it carries
forward the progressive role that Pound and Calabresi envisioned for the courts
in responding to prior major developments in the legal landscape.
CONCLUSION
In 1970, the Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, dissenting from
a majority opinion that refused to adopt pure comparative negligence in light
172 See Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 5, at 491–502 (describing this “agency
reference” model of judicial review); Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 95, at 2178–91
(elaborating upon this framework by looking to how heightened judicial review of preemptive regulations
would operate in practice); Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth,” supra note 95, at 1634–46 (endorsing a system
by which agencies’ conflict preemption determinations would be subject to more demanding judicial scrutiny).
173 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). For more in-depth discussion on Levine and its
implications for the agency reference model, see Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 95, at 2186–
88; Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth,” supra note 95, at 1638–40.
174 See Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth,” supra note 95, at 1638–40 (arguing that administrative
agencies’ preemptive determinations should be subject to more stringent judicial review given the fact that
they are not reviewed by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs).
175 See generally Sharkey, Tort-Agency Partnerships, supra note 5 (proposing this new tort preemption
paradigm).
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of the statutory enactment of an impure (50%) version, ominously portended
that “the death of the common law is near at hand.”176 Today—nearly half a
century later—the question is posed, “Is the United States Still a Common Law
Country?”177 Preemption of the common law is still perceived as a major
threat, although the potentially preemptive sources have now expanded to
include agencies as well as legislatures.
Following direction from Pound and Calabresi, we would do well to resist
the modern conservative core Supreme Court Justices’ nostalgia for a pre-New
Deal way of life.178 The challenge ahead would seem to be to re-envision the
role of courts in an age in which administrative regulations preponderate. The
United States is indeed still a common law country—not its nineteenth-century
version, but a distinctly twenty-first century version that is just coming into
view.

176 Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 177 N.W.2d 513, 523 (Wis. 1970) (Hallows, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Hallows argued that merely because the legislature had intervened to replace common law contributory
negligence with a form of impure comparative negligence, “nothing in its history or in its language . . . evinces
any intent to pre-empt this field of common law to the exclusion of this court.” Id. at 522. According to Justice
Hallows: “The doctrine of contributory negligence is a child of the common law and the court can and should
replace it with the doctrine of pure comparative negligence.” Id. at 523.
It is doubtful that either Pound or Calabresi would find convincing Chief Justice Hallows’s
forewarning that the “death of the common law is near at hand” unless courts scrupulously avoid finding
legislative preemption of common law activity. Pound and Calabresi recognized that the common law must
include statutes as a fundamental part of its fabric, see supra notes 147–64 and accompanying text; the same
can be said today of administrative regulations.
177 The decline of the common law has been the subject of a rich body of scholarly literature in recent
decades. See, e.g., KYLE SCOTT, DISMANTLING AMERICAN COMMON LAW: LIBERTY AND JUSTICE IN OUR
TRANSFORMED COURTS 2 (2007) (addressing “[t]he deterioration of the common law”); Patrick O. Gudridge,
The Persistence of Classical Style, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 663, 686–87 (1983) (“We might begin with the
‘decline’ of the common law. . . . [A]lternative sources of law have frequently displaced common law from its
traditional domain.”); Klass, supra note 17, at 551 (“Congress, state legislatures, and administrative
agencies . . . dominate large areas of the law formerly controlled by common law.”); A.C. Pritchard & Todd J.
Zywicki, Constitutions and Spontaneous Orders: A Response to Professor McGinnis, 77 N.C. L. REV. 537,
550 (1999) (“The demise of the common-law tradition in the twentieth century has undermined faith in judges
as faithful constitutional agents.”); Frederick Schauer, The Failure of the Common Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 765,
781 (2004) (observing “the decline of the common law model” in America).
178 Recall Justice Scalia’s lament: “Too many important decisions of the Federal Government are made
nowadays by unelected agency officials exercising broad lawmaking authority, rather than by the people’s
representatives in Congress.” EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1610 (2014) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).

